Maze of perpetual highway debt

道路公団民営化の問題点

The legislation calls for reorganizing the four existing highway corporations, including the flagship Japan Highway Public Corp., into six new companies, beginning around autumn 2005. The new companies, however, will transfer their assets (toll roads and bridges) and their debts to a quasi-public agency that will have effective control over them.

Whether the privatized companies can become efficient and effective under these circumstances is much in doubt. In particular, the plan clouds the prospects for debt cleanup, the main rationale for privatization. The combined debt of the four corporations exceeds ¥40 trillion. If the debt continues to pile up, privatization could end up as an empty slogan.

Highway reform became the rallying cry of politicians as costly investment projects widened the national deficit at a time of fiscal crisis. To stop the hemorrhaging, they proposed that the four highway entities be placed under private management. That was not a bad idea. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi made it a pillar of his structural reform agenda.

The debate that followed, however, turned into a bruising political battle over how to privatize. The road lobby of the governing Liberal-Democratic Party -- which initially opposed privatization -- insisted that the remaining highway construction program be completed as scheduled. In the end, a dubious compromise was reached that virtually ensured that unfinished projects throughout the country, covering a total distance of 2,000 km, would continue essentially unchanged.

In practical terms, the debate remained low key. The opposition Democratic Party of Japan introduced an attractive proposal to make highways toll-free. Given the mountainous debt, though, the plan seemed unrealistic. Free tolls, if they are feasible at all, can become a reality only after the debt is cleared. It's no wonder that the bill went by the wayside.

The reform package says the ¥44 trillion debt will be repaid completely in 45 years and that tolls will be abolished after that. The new companies, which will operate toll roads and bridges leased by the holding agency, will deduct expenses from toll revenues and pay the rest as lease charges. The question is whether the agency will be able to pay back all the debt.

The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport estimates that total debt payments, including interest (calculated at an annual average rate of 4 percent) will reach ¥84 trillion. The sum is payable, it says, because toll revenues are expected to average ¥2.6 trillion a year.

That estimate may be optimistic, though, because of uncertainties over long-term interest rates. If the average rate rises to 6 percent, for example, principal and interest payments will total ¥108 trillion.

Another question is whether the new companies will be really independent. For one thing, they won't be able to make profits from tolls because most of the revenue, excluding operating expenses, will go to the holding agency. Also, the government will continue to hold more than a third of their shares even after they go public.

With toll revenues denied as a source of income, the new companies will have to make profits from service and parking areas -- auxiliary operations handled by their affiliates.

Some of these "family enterprises," run mostly by former highway corporation officials, have been criticized for alleged business irregularities. Heavy reliance on these secondary operations is not a healthy trend for highway operators.

Continued government intervention is likely to create problems. The trick is that new highways are to be constructed in the next 15 years under a cost-sharing arrangement between the central and local governments.

This arrangement, involving a total outlay of ¥7.5 trillion, technically gives the new companies a veto power over new projects. In reality, though, they may find it difficult to reject decisions by the government -- their main shareholder.

All of this suggests that the privatized companies will continue to run their new organizations while looking for government action.

As a result, costly and unprofitable highway projects will likely continue, pushing the goal of debt cleanup further into the future.

The Japan Times Weekly
June 12, 2004
(C) All rights reserved

      計画によれば、2005年秋ごろに4公団を民営6社に再編し、道路資産（高速道路と橋梁）と負債を独立行政法人「高速道路保有・債務返済機構」に引き継ぐ。

      しかし民営化で債務返済が可能になるかどうかは不透明である。4公団の負債額は40兆円を超えており、もしも負債が増え続ければ、民営化の意味がなくなる。

      道路公団民営化は、巨額の道路建設計画による財政赤字拡大を食い止めるために、小泉改革の一環として計画された。

      しかし、自民党の「道路族」は既存の高速道路建設計画の温存を主張、結局、2000キロの未完成の建設計画は継続されることになった。

      野党民主党は、高速道路の無料解放を提案したが、道路公団の巨額の負債からみて、提案は現実的ではなかった。

      計画では、44兆円の負債は今後45年間で完済、その後高速道路は無料開放される。6社は道路保有機構から貸与された道路・橋梁を運営し、料金収入から管理費を差し引いた額を機構にリース料として支払う。問題は機構が債務を完済できるかどうかだ。

      国交省は、債務額は予定利率4%として、元利合計84兆円と見ている。道路料金収入は年間平均2兆6000億円になるので、債務返済は可能だという。だが長期金利の動向は不透明だ。

      もうひとつの問題は6社の独立性だ。料金収入は管理費を差し引き、道路保有機構のものになり利益を生まない。また、6社の株式の3分の1以上を政府が所有する。

      6社は道路料金を収入源として利用できず、関連会社が運営するサービスエリア、パーキングエリアで利益を求めなければならない。しかし、このような関連事業に依存するのは健全経営の道ではない。

      政府介入の継続は問題の元だ。今後15年間、7兆5000億円の高速道路建設は、中央官庁と地方自治体が費用を分担して行われる。6社は一応、計画の拒否権を持つが、会社支配に十分な株数を保有する政府の決定を拒否することは無理だろう。

      結局、むだな道路の建設は続けられ、債務返済は先送りにされる可能性が高い。